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Between the mid-sixties and the mid-seventies, the so-called "consumer
decade,"' Congress enacted a large number of consumer protection laws,
many in the area of health and safety.' In recent years, some of these laws
and the regulations promulgated under them have inspired harsh criti-
cism. Some critics,8 including many Reagan Administration appointees,4
have argued that rather than regulate, government should inform and
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1. Of 47 federal consumer protection laws enacted between 1891 and 1972, fewer than half, or 21
statutes, were enacted in the first 75 years; the remaining 26 were enacted in the years from 1966-
1972. This led some to call the latter period the "consumer decade." See Schwartz, The Consumer
Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32,
34 (1982).
2. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, 80 Stat.
736 (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 105) (1982); Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573,
86 Stat. 1207 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2051) (1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678) (1976 and Supp. V. 1981).
3. See Weidenbaum, Reforming Government Regulation, REGULATION, Nov./ Dec. 1980, at 15:
("The traditional notion that ... market failure is adequate justification for government intervention
badly needs to be revisited . . . .For some regulatory programs ...the provision of better public
information may enable consumers themselves to make more sensible trade-offs (for example, between
safety and price) than any standards set in Washington."); M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO
CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 227 (1980) (arguing government should provide health and safety
information but leave citizens "free to choose what chances we take with our lives").
4. See, e.g., Remarks of Virginia Knauer, Special Assistant to President Reagan for Consumer
Affairs, before the Agency for Instructional Television and the Joint Council on Economic Education,
in Arlington, Va. (Mar. 29, 1982) ("[Tloday we are finally, openly admitting that consumers have to
get the know-how and information to protect their own enlightened self-interests.") (on file with the
Yale Journal on Regulation); see also Hearings on the Nomination of Nancy Harvey Steorts to be
Chairman and Member of the Consumer Product Safety Commission Before the Subcommittee for
Consumers of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
43 (1981) (statement of Nancy Harvey Steorts) (stating that as Chairman of the CPSC, she planned
to push for a "cooperative" rather than "adversarial" agency attitude toward industry and to put a
"strong emphasis" on information and education programs).
Raymond Peck, President Reagan's first National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) administrator, demonstrated his faith in education campaigns by coupling his revocation of
the automobile "passive restraint" rule with the announcement that NHTSA planned to implement a
multi-year, multi-media information and education campaign designed to persuade drivers and pas-
sengers to wear seatbelts. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981). See infra section II.A.
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educate the public about the risks associated with various hazards and let
individuals choose whether or not to take the risks. '
Such a view is hardly novel. In fact, for several reasons the use of infor-
mation and education' as alternatives to direct regulation has always ap-
pealed to government agencies. First, many regulators believe that large
numbers of injuries and illnesses cannot be prevented through direct regu-
lation.6 Second, information and education programs seem to preserve in-
dividual choice while avoiding direct government involvement in industry's
production and pricing activities.7 Third, because information and educa-
tion programs usually bypass the complex procedural schemes most agen-
cies must follow in order to promulgate rules, 8 information and education
5. Although we use the terms "information" and "education" somewhat interchangeably, some
researchers draw a distinction between them. Information programs are notification schemes that con-
vey factual information, and nothing else, to the public. Implicit in the notification approach is the
belief that the public, once apprised of the facts, will make more informed judgments. Education
programs, on the other hand, are persuasion schemes that convey messages, which may or may not
contain factual information, which overtly seek to motivate members of the public to modify their
behavior.
Most government officials, including Reagan Administration appointees, have undertaken both
types of programs without regard to any distinctions between them. As stated by former NHTSA
Administrator Peck, it seems appropriate to employ the "behavior modification" techniques "that we
use every day in selling cereal, in selling soap, land) in selling political candidates" to save lives. Joint
Hearings on Small Car Safety Research Before the Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation, and
Materials and the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science
and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1982) (remarks of Raymond Peck) [hereinafter cited as
Small Car Safety Hearings].
6. See Regulatory Reform Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1976) (state-
ment of Richard 0. Simpson, Chairman, Consumer Product Safety Commission) ("Most experts
place the product-caused, or standards-preventable portion at somewhere between 15 percent and 25
percent of the total product-associated injury figure."); See also Miller & Parausraman, Advising
Consumers on Safer Product Use: The Information Role of the New Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission, 36 AM. MKTG. ASS'N PROc. 372, 373 (1974) ("The fact that at least 80 percent of the
consumer product-related injuries may not be caused by defective or unsafe products suggests that
consumer education has a very large untapped potential for reducing such injuries").
We suggest two qualifications to the view that only a small fraction of total injuries can be ad-
dressed by regulation while the remainder can be addressed by information and education. First,
technology may transform hazards that seem susceptible to reduction only by information and educa-
tion into risks that can be reasonably addressed by regulatory standards. For example, prior to the
passage of the Refrigerator Safety Act of 1956, at 15 U.S.C. § 1211 (1982) (standard promulgated at
16 C.F.R. § 1750 (1983)), most observers may have assumed that consumer education directed at
parents was the only way to prevent infant suffocation in abandoned refrigerators. The Act forced
manufacturers to develop doors that were easy enough to open from within should infants become
trapped, but also tightly enough closed that infants could not easily open them from outside. Manu-
facturers not only developed the necessary technology, but have reduced their costs in doing so. To our
knowledge, no infant has died in a refrigerator equipped with the new technology. Interview with
Robert Poth, Director, Division of Regulatory Management, Bureau of Compliance, Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 29, 1983).
Second, hazards which can not be averted by regulation are not necessarily susceptible to reduction
through the use of information and education. See infra section III.
7. S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 61 (1982).
8. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982), provides the basic
framework for agency rulemaking. The APA's informal rulemaking procedures, which most agencies
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programs permit-superficially, at least-easier and faster action than
rulemaking. Finally, information and education programs can be used to
enhance the image of agencies and their staffs-a point that is rarely lost
on government administrators.
The popularity of persuasion campaigns, of course, says little about
their effectiveness. While we do not challenge the value of all information
and education programs, we suggest their popularity rests more on philo-
sophical and ideological grounds than on solid empirical evidence support-
ing their ability to alter consumer behavior. We question the efficacy of
many education campaigns currently under way, especially those under-
taken by health and safety agencies.
In this Article, we explore some of the myths surrounding information
and education programs. We suggest that if they are to produce even mod-
est changes in consumer behavior, many of these programs require more
careful planning, larger expenditures and longer implementation periods
than they usually receive. To illustrate our point, we examine in some
detail three recent health and safety education campaigns-one promoting
safety belt use,' one advancing burn prevention measures10 and one urging
lifestyle changes to combat heart diseasen-which we believe underline
the difficulties facing even the most skilled attempts to promote behavioral
change through the use of information and education techniques.
In choosing these campaigns, we sought "exceptional" programs. The
programs described herein purported to incorporate "state of the art" per-
suasion techniques and contained sophisticated, detailed evaluation
schemes, characteristics by no means common to all information and edu-
cation programs. In two campaigns, the program results have been exten-
sively evaluated. In the third, preliminary but, we believe, significant re-
sults have been obtained. Our analysis of these campaigns highlights some
of the social, psychological, financial, and occasionally political, factors
that affect and often impede the success of educational campaigns gener-
ally. We hope our analysis will convince government officials and other
use today, require that the agency publish in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking
describing the substance of the proposed regulation, allow a period of time for submission of public
comments, and then publish a final rule along with a statement of the rule's basis and purpose. 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c). Executive agencies also must prepare a preliminary and final Regulatory Impact
Analysis demonstrating that the benefits of the proposed regulation outweigh its costs and that no less
costly alternative exists. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (1982). See also Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1982) (requiring agencies to
prepare an analysis of the objectives of any proposed rule affecting "small entities," the need for such
a rule, and the reasons why alternative actions were rejected). For a more complex set of rulemaking
procedures expressly mandated by statute, see 15 U.S.C. § 2058 (1982) (outlining procedures for
consumer product safety rules).
9. See infra section II.A.
10. See infra section II.B.
11. See infra section II.C.
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policymakers to undertake education campaigns with the same care and
restraint currently accorded regulatory proceedings.
I. Changing Behavior Through Education
Any attempt to change consumer behavior must take into account the
manifold complexities of the process of human persuasion. Health and
safety education programs, moreover, differ in important respects from
typical private sector "education," or advertising campaigns, and must
overcome additional obstacles.
A. Selling Safety vs. Selling Products
The twentieth century, among its other distinctions, surely will be
known as the age of mass communications. With the growth of print and
electronic media has come the growth of a vast communications industry,
including corps of mass "persuaders": propagandists, public relations spe-
cialists and the like." Television, in particular, seems capable of deeply
influencing the public.1" Given the array of tools available, one might well
suppose that little is beyond the capabilities of these persuaders, especially
those seeking to promote public health and safety.
Unfortunately, a considerable body of research has cast doubt on the
notion that mass persuasion techniques work very well in campaigns
designed to alter public attitudes and behavior regarding health and safety
concerns.14 Indeed, one respected observer seems to doubt that these tech-
niques work at all when employed to change deeply held attitudes and
behavior patterns. 5
12. See generally L. BOGART, STRATEGY IN ADVERTISING 2-11 (1967) (discussing the 20th cen-
tury information explosion and the increasing complexity of modern society which requires increasing
amounts of information). The 100 top national advertisers spent $17.1 billion for advertising in 1982,
an increase of 15.2 percent from the preceding year. Elmquist, 100 Leaders parry recession with
heavy spending, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 8, 1983, at 1. Television' and radio garnered $7.5 billion of
these advertising dollars. Id. at 168.
13. Television is a fixture in virtually every American household. Almost 78 million homes, or
roughly 98 percent, have at least one television set. By the time a child graduates from high school, he
or she will have spent more time in front of a television set (17,000 hours) than in a classroom
(11,000 hours). From early childhood through the high school years, television viewing occupies more
time than any activity other than sleeping. See L. Wallack, Television Programming, Advertising and
the Prevention of Alcohol-Related Problems (1983) (paper presented at the conference to review the
report, Alcohol and Public Policy: Beyond the Shadow of Prohibition, at National Academy of Sci-
ences, Washington, D.C. (May 20-21, 1983)) and studies cited therein.
14. See Cartwright, Some Principles of Mass Persuasion: Selected Findings of Research on the
Sale of United States War Bonds, 2 HUM. REL. 253, 267 (1949); Etzioni, Human Beings Are Not
Very Easy To Change After All, SAT. REV., June 3, 1972, at 45, 47; See generally Schramm, The
Nature of Communications between Humans, in THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICA.
TION 1, 11 (2d ed. 1971), and references cited therein.
15. See Etzioni, supra note 14, at 47 (expressing doubt that information campaigns work and
noting that social scientists are reevaluating old assumptions that behavior patterns can be easily
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It may sound paradoxical to suggest that techniques which seem to
work so well in promoting products would operate so poorly in promoting
safe behavior. The underlying premise of this proposition, however,
proves to be misleading. It is true that mass persuasion techniques sell
products, but they do so less easily than one might imagine. Merchandis-
ing and marketing remain more art than science, more intuition than rea-
son. Advertising annals continue to be filled with instances in which com-
panies devoted millions of dollars for market research, only to produce
marketing duds." For every dramatically successful ad campaign, there is
at least one Edsel campaign.
17
Moreover, the "social" marketing of health and safety requires a differ-
ent approach than ordinary product merchandising. Safety tends not to
have an inherent sales appeal. 8 While consumers will often avoid prod-
ucts they believe to be unsafe, they will rarely go out of their way to seek
goods reputed to be particularly safe. 9
Advertising for competitive products generally is aimed at persuading
consumers to choose particular brands of the kinds of items they plan to
buy anyway. It is less successful in convincing consumers to adopt new
buying patterns.2" Persuading consumers to purchase new types of pro-
ducts, or to change their behavior patterns in similarly significant ways,
tends to be a costly and unpredictable process. Thus, spending millions of
dollars to switch smokers from Camels to Kools may be profitable for the
makers of Kools, because the underlying smoking habit already exists. In
contrast, spending the same amount of money to convince smokers to
abandon cigarettes is likely to produce only meager results.2' Unfortu-
nately, public education campaigns often attempt to break deeply fixed
changed through education).
16. See generally R. HARTLEY, MARKETING MISTAKES (1976) (discussing classic marketing
mistakes).
17. J. DEUTSCH, SELLING THE PEOPLE'S CADILLAC: THE EDSEL AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
33-79 (1976); R. HARTLEY, supra note 16, at 59-70 (both sources discussing background of Edsel
marketing effort).
18. Laner & Sell, An Experiment on the Effect of Specially Designed Safety Posters, 34 OCCUPA-
TIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 34, 54 (1960).
19. Two surveys - one of the advertising industry (1975), and the other of consumer outdoor
garden equipment manufacturers (1977) - conducted by R. David Pittle while a Commissioner on
the Consumer Product Safety Commission, revealed a long-established practice of not advertising the
safety aspects of consumer products. This practice grew out of the view, strongly held both by manu-
facturers and by advertising agencies, that in general consumers do not make purchase decisions based
on safety (notes on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation). In addition, research conducted by R.
David Pittle, while on the faculty of Carnegie-Mellon University in 1972 (sponsored by National
Science Foundation Grant GI-3277X), revealed that, when approximately 2000 consumers were
questioned about factors they considered important in the product selection process, safety was found
not to be a significant consideration.
20. See M. MANDELL, ADVERTISING 161-62 (2d ed. 1974). See generally L. BOGART, supra note
12, at 61-68.
21. See Etzioni, supra note 14, at 47.
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consumer habits.
Ordinary product advertising is addressed to those consumers likely to
be favorably disposed to the product. Unlike product advertising, govern-
ment health and safety persuasion campaigns often seek to influence those
least disposed to listen to their message.12 Thus, many government cam-
paigns are unsuccessful because they are targeted at individuals who are
not receptive to the campaigns' messages. For example, simply convincing
teenagers to avoid alcohol or drug abuse has turned out to be far more
difficult than many researchers originally thought possible.2"
Product marketers may find considerable profit in small market share
increases which promoters of public information campaigns might con-
sider not cost-effective. For example, a favorable shift of two or three per-
cent in a product's market share might justify an expenditure of millions
of dollars by a cosmetics manufacturer - indeed, many spend that much
simply to maintain their market share.2 ' On the other hand, most govern-
ment agencies would think long and hard before trying to justify an ex-
penditure of millions of dollars upon the expectation of so small a shift in
consumer behavior.
2 5
It is also important to note that government persuasion campaigns, par-
ticularly in the health and safety area, usually promote abstract "prod-
ucts" with rather intangible benefits, whereas product marketers sell con-
crete products with immediate, tangible benefits. Consumer reactions tend
to be substantially weaker toward the former type of marketing.26
Of course, some of the differences between product merchandising and
public information campaigns may seem to work to the advantage of the
latter. Crest toothpaste, for example, has to compete with Colgate, Aim
and Aquafresh for a consumer's attention. Anti-drug and pro-seatbelt
campaigns would seem not to face comparable competing messages. Un-
fortunately, this is not the case. Public information messages, often in the
form of television and radio public service announcements, do compete
22. Bloom & Novelli, Problems and Challenges in Social Marketing, 45 J. MKTG. 79, 81-82
(1981) (Social marketers often segment on the basis of risk to the consumer. They will target their
efforts at drivers who tend to avoid using seatbelts, sexually active teenagers who tend to avoid using
contraceptives, heavy smokers, etc.).
23. Schmeling & Wotring, Making Anti-Drug Abuse Advertising Work, 20 J. ADVERTISING RE.
SEARCH 33 (1980).
24. Interview with Stan Cohen, Washington Editor, Advertising Age, in Washington, D.C. (Dec.
13, 1982). See generally L.. BOGART, supra note 12, at 17 (promotion of established product represents
continuing effort to maintain market position).
25. We do not wish to imply that government agencies necessarily obtain large shifts in consumer
behavior when they spend money on persuasion campaigns. Our point is that, when agencies justify
large expenditures, they anticipate large shifts in behavior even if only small shifts are ultimately
achieved.
26. Yarwood & Enis, Advertising and Publicity Programs in the Executive Branch of the Na-
tional Government: Hustling or Helping the People? 42 PUB. AD. REV. 37, 40 (1982).
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with one another both for air time and for the consumer's attention. They
also compete with product advertising that is generally more appealing
and exciting.27 Favorable portrayals of drug use and risk-taking in movies
and on television represent still more competition for health and safety
messages. The extent to which these other messages undermine health and
safety campaigns is not clear. But they do have an effect."
B. Creating Successful Information and Education Campaigns: Practice
and Pitfalls
Advertisers and market researchers have come to realize that the pro-
cess of persuasion is extremely complex. For a persuasion campaign to
succeed, consumers must: (i) receive and understand the message, (ii)
agree with the message, and (iii) act in accordance with the message.29
1. Transmitting Information Effectively
Researchers have found that simply conveying a message so that it is
widely received and understood can be exceedingly difficult. While this
finding no doubt distresses advocates of information disclosure, considera-
ble data suggest disclosure techniques, such as instructions and warning
labels, do not work very well.30 Advocates who rely on surveys indicating
a strong consumer desire for safety warnings and nutrition labels31 may
be misled about the usefulness of these techniques. Studies have shown a
significant discrepancy between the information consumers say they want
and the degree to which consumers make use of such information. Con-
sumers invariably indicate, when polled, a desire for information about
product characteristics such as nutrition, quality and safety to guide their
purchases. 2 Yet, studies show that consumers rarely seek this information
from available sources.8" In fact, there is evidence indicating that most
consumers do not read such information when it is provided. 4
27. Beals, Mazis, Salop & Staelin, Consumer Search and Public Policy, 8 J. CONSUMER RE-
SEARCH 11, 21 (1981) ("[Gjovernment agencies interested in altering consumer behavior through the
provision of information must acknowledge that they are in competition with sellers for the attention
of the consumer.").
28. Schmeling & Wotring, supra note 23, at 36-37.
29. We have divided the process of persuasion into three steps for analytical purposes only. These
steps do not represent three distinct and separate phases in the persuasion process. See Schramm,
supra note 14, at 36-41.
30. See Jacoby, Chestnut & Silberman, Consumer Use and Comprehension of Nutrition Informa-
tion, 4 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 119 (1977). See also Dorvis & Purswell, Warnings and Human
Behavior: Implications for the Design of Product Warnings, 1 J. PROD. LIAB. 25 (1977).
31. Jacoby, Chestnut & Silberman, supra note 30, at 121.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. For example, in a newsletter of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a recent article criticizing
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Some of the reasons for the difficulty in transmitting "public service"
information-including health and safety information-successfully seem
easy to pinpoint. Anyone who has sorted through his or her daily "junk"
mail, or dashed through a supermarket with barely a glance at price la-
bels, let alone nutrition labels, knows that modern American society is
flooded with "information," not all of which can easily be absorbed.
Furthermore, skillful and creative packaging of public service messages,
which might make them more successful, is all too rare. As any viewer of
late-night television knows, public service appeals often are inept, almost
laughable. The "ineptness" factor is only one of a host of practical
problems that plague most public service campaigns. In addition, informa-
tion campaigns often suffer from poor media visibility due to message
placement during low viewing times, overly vague and unspecific
messages, unduly short campaign periods and a general failure to target
audiences. 5
In addition to these practical problems, researchers suggest an addi-
tional, more subtle reason why audiences do not receive information from
information and education campaigns. Consumers often "filter" the infor-
mation to which they are exposed. When a message conflicts with a per-
son's prevailing cognitive structure, the message will be rejected or dis-
torted to make it palatable.3 In songwriter Paul Simon's words, "A man
hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest."'13
2. Changing Consumer Attitudes
Once an information or education campaign message has successfully
reached a consumer's consciousness, there remains the problem of con-
vincing the individual of the merits of the message. The process of chang-
ing the attitudes of consumers who understand a message is itself enor-
mously complex.
A central difficulty social marketers encounter is the tenuous relation-
ship between increased knowledge and changes in attitude. A consumer's
ability to recall the specifics of an information campaign does not neces-
the FDA's proposal to require the inclusion of consumer information in prescription drug packages
cited the case of a Minneapolis bank that mailed 120,000 pamphlets explaining its automated teller
machine to customers. A special paragraph inserted into one hundred of the pamphlets offered $10 to
anyone who read the paragraph and asked for the money. Not one customer took advantage of the
offer. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, FDA Reconsiders Patient Package Insert Program, 3 WASHING-
TON WATCH 12 (1981).
35. See Schmeling & Wotring, supra note 23, at 34, and studies cited therein.
36. See Cartwright, supra note 14, at 25. See generally E. JONES & H. GERARD, FOUNDATIONS
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 236-39 (1967).
37. P. SIMON & A. GARFUNKEL, The Boxer, on BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATER side 2, track 1
(1969), rereleased on SIMON AND GARFUNKEL'S GREATEST HITS side 1, track 3 (1972).
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sarily mean that the consumer agrees with the object of the campaign.
Studies have shown, for example, that many smokers exposed to informa-
tion about cigarette-related health problems fail to change their attitudes
toward smoking."8 Indeed, audience attitudes may actually harden against
the information conveyed in public interest messages."
These results are possible because messages do not simply flow in a
linear fashion from the media to a passive, receptive audience. Instead,
messages are transformed and redefined in various ways as they move into
the public consciousness. For example, the widely recognized "opinion
leader" phenomenon 0 affects the impact of information in significant, and
often unpredictable, ways. Influential friends or family who amplify a
message may cause other individuals to change their attitudes, while opin-
ion leaders who criticize or ignore a message may completely undermine
its impact.
The social class of audience members also seems to influence the extent
to which messages affect consumer attitudes. Consumers in lower socio-
economic groups appear to be less influenced by information and educa-
tion messages than are those in other groups. One study of childhood acci-
dents, for example, has concluded that low-income parents demonstrate a
"fatalistic" attitude toward their children's exposure to hazards. 1 This
attitude often leads to the abdication of responsibility for reducing the
children's exposure to risks; it also immunizes the parents against most
forms of safety education."'
This difference in the relative receptivity of consumers in different so-
cial classes is particularly significant because many health and safety edu-
cation campaigns are aimed at reducing hazards more commonly found
among lower socioeconomic groups."8 Campaigns designed to encourage
38. See Staclin, The Effects of Consumer Education on Consumer Product Safety Behavior, 5 J.
CONSUMER RESEARCH 30, 31 (1978).
39. See, e.g., Cooper & Jahoda, The Evasion of Propaganda: How Prejudiced People Respond to
Anti-Prejudice Propaganda, in THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATION 282-99 (2d ed.
1971) ("Mr. Biggott" experiment, which provided literature opposing racial prejudice to prejudiced
viewers, reinforced, rather than moderated, audience's views).
40. This term was first used in 1948 by a group of researchers analyzing voter decisionmaking
processes during the course of an election campaign. The researchers found that substantial numbers
of voters relied not on the mass media but on the advice of friends and family - the "opinion leaders"
- in deciding whom to vote for. See P. LAZARSFELD, B. BERELSON & H. GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S
CHOICE 49-51 (1948). Since then, social scientists have found the opinion leader phenomenon in virtu-
ally every aspect of consumer decision making. See Meyer, Maccoby & Farquhar, The Role of Opin-
ion Leadership in a Cardiovascular Health Education Campaign, 1 COM. Y.B. 584-85 (1977) and
references cited therein.
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vaccinations," preventive dental care,' safe behavior with guns,' and
seatbelt usage' 7 have all foundered as they have reached out to these
groups.'
8
The recognition of the importance of social class, selective perception,
opinion leaders and a host of other factors' " has led social scientists to
reevaluate the process of communication. 50 During the last forty years,
most researchers have gradually abandoned the notion that communica-
tions reach a passive, homogeneous audience and have developed instead a
model in which messages are received by highly active, highly selective
audiences which manifest widely varying reactions. 1 The complex nature
of audiences thus requires that educators who seek to change attitudes
employ extremely sophisticated communication methods.
3. Translating Changed Attitudes Into Modified Behavior
Although it seems logical that changed consumer attitudes should trans-
late easily into changed behavior, the relationship between changed atti-
tudes and behavior is, in fact, not well understood. At least in the health
and safety area, the difficulties that educators face in persuading consum-
ers to change their attitudes appear with equal, if not greater, force in
attempts to motivate consumers who agree with messages to do something
about them.
In the health and safety area, a number of studies evaluating the link
between attitude changes and subsequent behavior provide little encour-
agement to the advocates of information and education programs.52 For
44. Hingson, Obtaining Optimal Attendance At Mass Immunization Programs, 89 HEALTH SER-
VICES REP. 53, 54 (1974) ("receiving of immunizations is related to various measures of socioeconomic
status").
45. Gelb & Gilly, The Effect of Promotional Techniques on Purchase of Preventive Dental Care,
6 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 305, 307 (1979).
46. Klein, Reizen, Van Amburg & Walker, Some Social Characteristics of Young Gunshot Fatal-
ities, 10 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PRtVENTION 177 (1978).
47. Waller & Hall, Literacy - A Human Factor in Driving Performance, ACCIDENT CAUSA-
TION, 1980, at 15.
48. The difficulties education campaigns have in reaching the poor pose a dilemma for those who
set public policies. Many opponents of product regulation believe that by raising product prices such
regulation harms the poor. To the extent that information and education campaigns fail to adequately
reach the poor, however, those who oppose product regulation and seek to aid the poor cannot advo-
cate information and education as a meaningful alternative.
49. See J. KLAPPER, THE EFFECTS OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 3-4 (1960) (listing many factors
that affect the flow of a message from the sender to the consumer).
50. Id.
51. See Schramm, supra note 14, at 6-12.
52. It should be noted that evaluation studies remain the exception rather than the rule in health
and safety education efforts. One marketing expert cites several possible reasons for the lack of evalua-
tion research: (i) many education programs are designed and initiated by "action-oriented" individuals
who approach these with the a priori view that education works and who thus see no need to docu-
ment this belief, (ii) evaluation research requires complex, time consuming, and often expensive ex-
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example, in one recent study,"' an experimental group of mothers received
intensive training on home safety practices while a control group received
no training. The experimental group indicated that the training had con-
vinced them to improve the safety of their homes and had led them to do
so. Surprisingly, however, members of the experimental group demon-
strated no safer behavior than did the control group when researchers
made unannounced visits to their homes.54
At times, the results of attitude changes can seem counterintuitive or
even perverse. In another study, an experimental group of mothers ex-
posed to messages advocating the postponement of toilet training claimed
to have been persuaded by the messages. Subsequent interviews with the
mothers indicated that their new views had persisted over time. Upon in-
vestigation, however, researchers found that the experimental group actu-
ally began toilet training their children at an earlier age than did the
control group.5" Similarly, industry foremen given an intensive two week
training course which stressed the need to show considerate behavior to-
ward factory workers scored significantly higher than. a control group on
questionnaires designed to elicit attitudes towards "consideration." Para-
doxically, researchers found that foremen who had taken the course actu-
ally showed less considerate behavior than foremen who had never taken
the course."'
Some researchers, reflecting on these results, have concluded that educa-
tion campaigns simply cannot adequately address most public health and
safety concerns. 57 Others, while remaining more optimistic, readily con-
cede that the link between attitudes and behavior is complex," and admit
that changed attitudes provide no guarantee that behavior will be simi-
larly changed."
perimental designs to control for a host of confounding and intervening variables and (iii) consumer
behavior changed by education campaigns often takes a long time to manifest itself. Measuring the
delayed effect of a campaign often requires extending the evaluation past the termination of most
education campaigns. See Staelin, supra note 38, at 31. See also Festinger, Behaviorial Support for
Opinion Change, 28 PUB. OPINION Q. 404 (1964) (noting the paucity of evaluation studies).
53. Dershewitz & Williamson, Prevention of Childhood Injuries: A Controlled Clinical Trial, 67
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1148 (1977).
54. Id.
55. N. Maccoby, A. Romney, J. Adams & E. Maccoby, "Critical Periods" in Seeking and Ac-
cepting Information (1962), discussed in Festinger, supra note 52, at 409-410.
56. E. Fleishmann, E. Harris & H. Borh, Leadership and Supervision in Industry: An Evalua-
tion of a Supervisory Training Program, (1955) (Ohio State University, Bureau of Education Re-
search), discussed in Festinger, supra note 52, at 410-11.
57. See Dershewitz & Williamson, supra note 53, at 1148.
58. See Staelin, supra note 38, at 31.
59. Id.
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4. Maintaining Changed Behavior Over Time
Some education campaigns, once effective, need not be repeated. A cam-
paign to convince consumers to buy smoke detectors, for example, would
seem successful if most consumers installed smoke detectors - a one time
act.60 Many health and safety hazards addressed by current education
campaigns, however, do not lend themselves so readily to resolution by
one time actions. Convincing consumers to wear seatbelts once or to avoid
fatty foods for one day obviously would not reduce risks significantly.
Accordingly, in many instances, consumer educators not only must lead
their audiences to change their behavior but must also motivate them to
maintain the changed behavior over time. Regrettably, few consumer edu-
cators, especially those in government agencies, have looked at the long-
term impacts of their programs. 1 Short budget cycles, sudden personnel
shifts, and the inclination of agencies always to introduce new and differ-
ent approaches to problems, doom many programs to short lives."2
Even programs committed to the long run face difficulties. One problem
well known to product advertisers is "wearout." That is, advertisements
and advertising campaigns lose the ability to generate new or repeat sales
over time as the public grows weary of the message. Product advertisers
often are able to revive the appeal of their products by changing their
messages. Presumably, consumer educators could do the same,64 although
the time and expense involved tend to discourage them from doing so.
Unfortunately, as a consequence of the various forces which inhibit pro-
gram longevity, most education campaigns generate few changes that sur-
vive them."
60. Of course, battery operated detectors would require replacement cells from time to time. The
replacement task, however, seems minor.
61. Bloom & Novelli, supra note 22, at 82-83.
62. Id.
63. Axelrod, Advertising Wearout, 20 J. ADVERTISING RESEARCH 13 (1980) (noting that while
repetition in advertising is beneficial, wearout phenomenon limits ability of commercials to generate
new or repeat sales).
64. The Swedish government adopted an interesting approach to avoiding "wearout" in its ciga-
rette health warning program by requiring manufacturers to rotate required disclosure messages. See
Maxis & Staelin, Using Information Principles in Public Policymaking, I J. MKTG. & PUB. POL'Y 3,
6 (1982).
65. See Cousins, The Effects of Public Education on Subjective Probability of Arrest for Impaired
Driving: A Field Study, 12 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 131, 137 (1980) (listing studies
demonstrating the short-lived effects of campaigns - including those associated with passage of stiff
legislation - directed against drunk driving). See also McNeill & Wilkie, Public Policy and Con-
sumer Information: Impact of the New Energy Labels, 6 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 1 (1979) (noting
that, in response to the energy crises of the 1970s, "consumers have been asked to slow down, turn
down, commute together, and generally adjust their energy consumption on a daily basis. However, in
most cases, consumer behavior has gradually returned to pre-crisis norms.") One of the few cam-
paigns to use "booster" techniques in years subsequent to the primary campaign is the British seatbelt
campaign. From at least 1972 to 1979, the Ministry of Transport ran its ad campaign every year for
about six weeks. According to a report by NHTSA, the British approach seems to have been quite
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II. Three Case Studies
Each of the education campaigns described in this section incorporated
many of the elements which must characterize successful information and
education programs. Even so, each campaign has revealed the significant
limitations of this approach. The NHTSA case study,"' examined partly
in its political context, suggests some of the political considerations that
often motivate policymakers to undertake ineffective education campaigns.
Project Burn Prevention"' shows that even carefully crafted programs may
be unable to overcome the inherent difficulties education campaigns con-
front. Finally, the Stanford Three Community heart disease program 8
demonstrates that even where local campaigns are successful it may be
extremely difficult to operate such campaigns on a nationwide basis.
A. Promoting Safety Belt Use
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) re-
cently began a three-year education campaign designed to increase safety
belt use" in the United States.7 This ongoing effort provides a useful
context in which to examine the possibilities and limitations of education
campaigns. Unlike previous U.S. safety belt campaigns, the current
NHTSA program is national in scope" and contains a reliable and pre-




Despite its apparent advantages over earlier campaigns, NHTSA's ef-
fort to date has produced only minimal gains in safety belt use. These
preliminary results are not surprising given the ineffectiveness of past
safety belt campaigns and the level of resources committed to the current
effort.
successful. OFFICE OF PROGRAM AND DEMONSTRATION, U.S. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF
SAFETY BELT AND CHILD RESTRAINT USAGE PROGRAMS 29 (1982) [hereinafter cited as NHTSA
SAFETY BELT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT], reprinted in Small Car Safety Hearings, supra note 5, at 332-
449.
66. See infra section II.A.
67. See infra section lI.B.
68. See infra section II.C.
69. We will use the terms "safety belt" and "seatbelt" interchangeably throughout this section.
70. See NHTSA SAFETY BELT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note 65, at 88.
71. The narrow geographic scope of most education programs conducted each year severely limits
their effectiveness.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 110 and 111.
73. See Hearings on Appropriations for 1983 Before the Subcommittee on the Department of
Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations of the House Committee on Appropriations,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 329, 457 (1982) (statement of Raymond Peck, Administrator) [hereinafter cited
as Appropriations Hearings].
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1. The Problem: Highway Carnage and Low Seatbelt Usage
Motor vehicles, for all their usefulness, claim more lives and produce
more injuries than any other consumer product in the United States. Each
year, 34,000 people are killed and more than half a million receive moder-
ate to severe injuries as a result of highway accidents."'
According to NHTSA estimates, if all occupants wore seatbelts, motor
vehicle fatalities could be cut in half, injuries could be reduced by sixty-
five percent, and billions of dollars in lost economic output and medical
bills could be saved. 7' Yet, only a fraction of American drivers and pas-
sengers-about 11.3 percent both in 1981 and 1982-regularly wear
seatbelts.7
Low seatbelt use is by no means a new problem in this country. Since
1967, when the Department of Transportation (DOT) first required
automakers to install seatbelts in all passenger cars, 7 NHTSA has tried
to persuade, cajole, and sometimes compel consumers to wear seatbelts.
For example, when it had become obvious that only a small fraction of
consumers was wearing seatbelts, DOT, in 1972, issued a rule requiring
auto manufacturers to install lap and shoulder belts in all 1974 models,
along with an ignition interlock system that prevented engine ignition if
the belts were not connected.78 Public outcry against the interlock system
led Congress to order DOT to rescind the interlock requirement. 79
74. NHTSA SAFETY BELT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note 65, at 1.
75. NHTSA bases these conclusions on its estimate that 180 lives would be saved and 3,400
serious injuries avoided for every one percent increase in seatbelt use. Id. at xi. Cf Appropriations
Hearings, supra note 73, at 382 (Administrator Peck stated that 172 lives could be saved for every one
percent increase in safety belt use but did not say whether NHTSA had dropped its earlier estimate
of 180). The General Accounting Office (GAO), however, has questioned NHTSA's calculation of the
marginal effectiveness of changes in seatbelt use rates:
Several experts outside the Federal Government whom we contacted . . . agreed with DOT
that if all people not now wearing their safety belts (about 90 percent of the population) were
convinced to do so-on the average-each one percent point increase would save 180 lives and
prevent 3400 serious injuries. However, these experts said that the individuals comprising the
first percentage point increase would probably be the most concerned with their personal safety
and therefore less likely to be involved in accidents causing fatalities and serious injuries.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATUS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION'S SAFETY BELT PROGRAM 86 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
GAO REPORT].
76. See OFFICE OF DRIVER AND PEDESTRIAN RESEARCH, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DIVI.
SION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, RESTRAINT SYSTEM USAGE IN THE
TRAFFIC POPULATION 3 (1983) (research notes) [hereinafter cited as RESTRAINT SYSTEM USAGE
REPORT).
77. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208-Seatbelt Installation-Passenger Cars, 32 Fed.
Reg. 2408 (1967) (current version at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1982)). See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Dep't. of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 209-213 (D.C. Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded sub noma.
Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983), for a detailed
history of seatbelt regulation.
78. 37 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1972) (current version at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1982)).
79. See generally Robertson, The Great Seatbelt Campaign Flop, 26 J. COM. 41, 43 (1976).
Education Campaigns
Although the fact is often overlooked, NHTSA issued the 1972 rule as
a first step toward its broader goal of "complete passive protection."8 To
realize this goal, NHTSA issued a new standard ordering manufacturers
to install either automatic seatbelts or air bags on all cars sold in the
United States.81 This "passive restraint rule" was intended to be phased
in by 1984.
Less than a year after Ronald Reagan became President, NHTSA dra-
matically shifted gears and revoked its passive restraint rule.8" In re-
scinding the standard, NHTSA indicated its intention to undertake a ma-
jor educational effort to increase voluntary seatbelt use. 3 The agency
claimed that the education campaign would be more successful and less
expensive than the passive restraint rule.8" NHTSA predicted that its
education campaign would more than double safety belt use rates-from
about eleven percent to at least twenty-five percent 5-with a correspond-
ing -decrease in annual highway fatalities of 3,000 to 5,000.86 In sharp
contrast, the agency estimated that the rescinded passive restraint rule
would have increased use by a mere four to five percentage points while
saving only 688 to 860 lives per year.8"
Insurance and consumer groups successfully challenged the rescission of
the passive restraint standard, leading the Supreme Court to order
NHTSA to reassess its decision.88 Despite the Court's ruling and severe
80. See Amendment of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, Pub. L. No. 93-492, § 109,
88 Stat. 1482 (1974) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1410(b) (1982)). See also Robertson, supra note
79, at 43.
81. 42 Fed. Reg. 24,289 (1977) (current version at 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1982)) (modified stan-
dard 208).
82. 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (1981).
83. Id. at 53,425.
84. See Appropriations Hearings, supra note 73, at 382.
85. See Letter from Raymond Peck, Administrator, NHTSA, to the Honorable William Lehman,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives (March 2, 1983) [herein-
after cited as Peck Letter]. Administrator Peck estimated that "the aggregate effect of the programs
now planned should result in statistically valid measurement of national usage rates in the range of 25
percent in the next three years." But cf. Small Car Safety Hearings, supra note 5, at 330-331, where
Administrator Peck predicted that NHTSA's education campaign would achieve at least 35 percent
use rates.
86. NHTSA's prediction is based on its estimate that 180 lives would be saved for every one
percent increase in safety belt use. See NHTSA SAFETY BELT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note
65, at xi.
87. See Appropriations Hearings, supra note 73, at 329, 392. NHTSA estimated that, under the
passive restraints rule, manufacturers would have chosen to install detachable automatic safety belts
rather than airbags 99 percent of the time. The agency assumed that most people would then detach
their passive belts. This analysis represents a complete reversal of NHTSA's view under the Carter
Administration, when it estimated that passive restraints would save 9,000 lives and avoid 65,000
serious injuries each year, at a cost to consumers of about $25 per car (plus operating costs) for
automatic safety belts and $112 per car (plus operating costs) for air bags. See UNITED STATES REGU-
LATORY COUNCIL, THE AUTOMOBILE CALENDAR: RECENT AND PENDING FEDERAL ACTIVITIES AF-
FECTING MOTOR VEHICLES 242-47 (1981) [hereinafter cited as AUTOMOBILE CALENDAR].
88. Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S.Ct. 2856 (1983).
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congressional criticism, NHTSA" continues to give its seatbelt education
campaign high priority.8'
2. The Safety Belt Campaign
The current NHTSA safety belt campaign was designed against a
background of other campaigns that failed to achieve significant gains in
seatbelt use. NHTSA claims that its program will not repeat these
failures.
a. Previous Campaigns
Before initiating the current seatbelt campaign, NHTSA reviewed over
160 studies of past efforts to promote safety belt use. With few exceptions,
these studies showed that seatbelt promotion campaigns produced negligi-
ble results."0 Nevertheless, NHTSA concluded that Americans still might
be persuaded to use seatbelts." From past studies, the agency noted that
consumers are reluctant to wear seatbelts because of their perceived incon-
venience, fear of entrapment during an accident, and plain forgetfulness.
The studies also demonstrated that consumers would probably wear
seatbelts more often if they knew the true probability and consequences of
being in an accident, understood the safety value of seatbelts, and devel-
oped the habit of wearing seatbelts at an early age.' 2
In the course of its review of previous educational efforts, NHTSA
studied both American and foreign campaigns." Only one American cam-
paign was linked to a substantial increase in safety belt use, and this effort
relied on self-reporting by consumers-a generally unreliable measure-
ment technique.' 4 However, foreign campaigns, most notably those con-
ducted in Great Britain and Sweden, showed more encouraging re-
sults-often raising rates into the twenty to thirty-five percent range.'
5
Based, in part, on the reported success of foreign campaigns, NHTSA
89. See generally Appropriations Hearings, supra note 73; Small Car Safety Hearings, supra note
5.
90. See NHTSA SAFETY BELT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note 65, at 28-39, for a discussion
of the limited impact of past seatbelt promotion campaigns.
91. Id. at 27; See also Appropriations Hearings, supra note 73, at 382.
92. NHTSA SAFETY BELT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note 65, at 23.
93. Id. at 28-39.
94. See id. at 35-36. Self-reported usage in this program rose from 29 to 41 percent. However, a
follow-up campaign, in which usage rates were actually observed, demonstrated a starting rate of only
12.4 percent and a final rate of only 16.8 percent.
95. Id. at 29-34. Note, however, that much of the reported success of foreign campaigns was only
temporary. Id. at 28. Virtually every nation studied, including Great Britain, went on to enact
mandatory safety belt legislation. In other words, in most countries the primary effect of safety belt
campaigns seems to have been to create public support for compulsory seatbelt laws. Id. at 33. See
also infra notes 118-20.
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initially predicted that a "sufficiently powerful" education effort could
lead to seatbelt use rates of at least thirty-five percent." Only after receiv-
ing intense congressional questioning97 did the agency lower its estimate to
twenty-five percent.98
b. NHTSA 's "New" Approach
The failure of past American safety belt campaigns, which used only
mass media techniques, led NHTSA to conclude that mass media cam-
paigns alone are not powerful enough to induce significant changes in
consumer behavior.9 ' As a result, NHTSA designed a campaign which
combines mass media tactics with education and incentive programs, and
private mandatory use requirements.1 "
Education: NHTSA has strongly criticized previous seatbelt campaigns
for their failure to include educational components. 1 ' According to the
agency, simple mass media programs convey only brief messages to many
potential targets, while education campaigns-through lectures, group ses-
sions, movies, school projects, study lessons, brochures, and the like-can
transmit longer, more informative, and more persuasive messages to small,
carefully targeted audiences.'0° Thus, NHTSA has promoted its message
through a process it terms "networking," which involves the use of na-
tional organizations to convey messages to their members. The agency has
contacted or plans to contact educational, health, medical, civic, safety,
business, government, military, insurance, law enforcement, and media
groups.
03
Despite the agency's enthusiasm for the education element of its pro-
gram, none of the education studies cited by NHTSA demonstrated any
greater success in promoting seatbelt use than the mass media campaigns
96. Id. at xi, 27. Interestingly, in reaching this conclusion NHTSA relied heavily on a number of
studies done in the mid-1970s and virtually ignored a more recent 1978 study by Peter D. Hart
Research Associates, which reached a far more pessimistic conclusion:
The majority [of consumers] rarely use seatbelts . . . . There are few signs here that this
situation will change. Even though the vast majority of Americans express considerable con-
cern about auto accidents . . . nonetheless they decide not to use seatbelts. Nor is there any
sign of increasing seatbelt use among the young ...
Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Public Attitudes Toward Passive Restraint Systems (1978) (re-
port prepared for NHTSA), reprinted in NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY METHODS FOR
INCREASING USE OF SAFETY BELTS, TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, REVIEW OF PROGRAMS
DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE USE OF SAFETY BELTS 61 (1979).
97. See generally Appropriations Hearings, supra note 73.
98. See Peck Letter, supra note 85.
99. NHTSA SAFETY BELT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra note 65, at ix, 28.
100. See id. at 88.
101. See id. at 40.
102. Id. at 39.
103. Id. at 88-90.
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reviewed by the agency. NHTSA argues that its program will succeed
where others failed because the combination of mass media and education
components will create a synergistic effect that was absent from past
efforts.'"
Incentives: In its Safety Belt Effectiveness Report, NHTSA noted that
incentives and rewards are the primary means used by psychological re-
searchers and practitioners to induce desired behavioral changes. Yet, ac-
cording to the agency, these means have been "virtually absent" from ef-
forts to promote seatbelt use.108 Consequently, NHTSA has sought to
create an incentive structure that rewards individuals who wear seatbelts
and organizations that promote seatbelt use. The agency, for example, has
lobbied insurance companies to offer favorable insurance rates to their
customers who wear seatbelts1 o
Use Requirements: NHTSA's plan to encourage private and public
employers to adopt mandatory use requirements rounds out the agency's
new approach. According to NHTSA, safety belt use has risen to as much
as 50-90 percent where employers have required their employees to wear
safety belts on the job.1 07 Of course, the success of these policies depends
on the employer's ability and willingness to enforce them,108 both of
which may be limited.' 9
3. Results
Over the past two years, NHTSA has monitored the program's results
in nineteen U.S. cities and at roughly fifty sites within each city. 10 The
most recent report from the agency's nineteen-city survey shows that esti-
mated national seatbelt use has increased from 11.3 to 13.9 percent-2.6
percentage points. 11 Applying the agency's formula of 180 lives saved for
every percentage point increase in safety belt use, the current campaign
104. Id. at 88-93.
105. Id. at 51.
106. According to NHTSA, nearly 90 percent of those asked say that they would wear seatbelts if
they would receive reduced insurance premiums. Id. at 52. However, insurance companies have been
reluctant to endorse this type of incentive because of the difficulty of verifying that policyholders are
actually wearing their seatbelts. Id.
107. Id. at 58-62.
108. For example, strict enforcement of belt policies has led to high use rates on military bases.
Id. at 60.
109. See generally Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Problems with Company Belt-Use
Approach, (August 5, 1981) (status report).
110. See RESTRAINT SYSTEM USAGE REPORT, supra note 76, at 3. See also Appropriations Hear-
ings, supra note 73, at 460.
111. See OFFICE OF DRIVER & PEDESTRIAN RESEARCH, U.S. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, SAFETY BELT AND CHILD SAFETY SEAT USE DATA: OCTOBER, 1983 - DE.
CEMBER, 1983 (1984).
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has saved roughly 936 lives during its first two years.11 2 Depending on
one's assumptions, the cost-benefit ratio of these results could vary widely.
Nonetheless, because of the exceptionally high costs of highway tragedies,
the program may still have been cost-beneficial. " ' Other approaches to




Although the current NHTSA campaign employs more sophisticated
techniques than previous campaigns,"' the agency's program seems un-
likely to achieve anything near its goal of twenty-five percent safety belt
use by the end of 1984. The modest results of NHTSA's education cam-
paign to date indicate that it is destined to repeat earlier failures."'
NHTSA believes its mass media, education, incentive, and private
mandatory use programs provide a powerful combination that will make
its new seatbelt campaign the most successful in American history.117 The
agency grounds its optimism on the reported success of seatbelt education
campaigns conducted in other countries. " 8 But more often than not, the
112. The GAO's analysis, supra note 75, at 86, indicates that these estimates may be exaggerated
because safer drivers-i.e., those that have fewer accidents in any case-are the ones most likely to
respond to a seatbelt campaign. NHTSA's predictions may also be overly optimistic in assuming that
increases in seatbelt use will be permanent. Previous studies show that the increases in seatbelt use
from education campaigns are usually quite temporary. See supra note 95.
113. At the risk of oversimplifying, if one assumes, as NHTSA does, that 180 lives are saved and
3400 injuries avoided with every percentage point increase in seatbelt use, see supra note 75, then the
2.6 percent increase over two years has saved at least 936 lives and avoided 17,680 serious injuries.
Given annual program costs of $3.23 million, the cost per life saved has been $6,902 and the cost per
injury avoided $365. If one uses the GAO's estimate of $27 million for the cost of the program, the
cost per life saved increases to $19,231 and the cost per injury avoided jumps to $1,018. Even these
figures yield positive net benefits given NHTSA's assumption that each life saved produces benefits of
$265,000 and each injury avoided produces $9,400 in benefits.
We should note that these computations address only NHTSA's costs for the campaign, not total
social costs. For example, NHTSA claims that many private sector groups have contributed advertise-
ments and other resources to the campaign. In a strict cost-benefit analysis, these costs would also
have to be included, as would such items as consumer inconvenience (buckle-up costs). We have not
attempted to calculate these indirect costs.
114. We do not propose to review the extensive literature on the costs and benefits of passive
restraint requirements. Suffice it to say that we believe a passive restraint rule that excludes the
detachable belts option would likely be cost-beneficial. The key point is that merely because the edu-
cation campaign may produce positive net benefits to society does not mean that it will be more
effective than other regulatory approaches. See, e.g., AUTOMOBILE CALENDAR, supra note 87, at 242-
247. This report, compiled near the end of the Carter Administration, demonstrates that until 1981
NHTSA strongly favored its passive restraint requirements. The Automobile Calendar also surveyed
other NHTSA proposals for improving auto safety, including promotion of state safety belt laws,
crashworthiness ratings, and general design requirements.
115. See Appropriations Hearings, supra note 73, at 456-57.
116. See supra note 90.
117. Appropriations Hearings, supra note 73, at 456-57.
118. NHTSA cited seatbelt campaigns in Great Britain and Sweden as evidence of the potential
for the success of a true education program. NHTSA SAFETY BELT EFFECTIVENESS REPORT, supra
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apparent success of such campaigns was only temporary and was achieved
at a very high cost."1 9 Foreign campaigns have been more successful in
creating public attitudes in favor of mandatory use laws than in achieving
permanent gains in seatbelt use.' 20
In addition, the campaign is insufficiently comprehensive to overcome
ingrained behavior patterns regarding safety belt use. Notwithstanding
NHTSA's optimism about its ability to change negative attitudes toward
seatbelt use, it has not realized that the establishment of favorable atti-
tudes toward a product like safety belts is often not enough to overcome
firmly entrenched behavior patterns-in this case the longstanding refusal
to wear seatbelts.' 2
Solid and regular reinforcement is needed to increase seatbelt use and
maintain such gains. Yet, little in NHTSA's education campaign suggests
that the agency will be able to invest the resources and time necessary to
achieve permanent increases in seatbelt use. First of all,. although
NHTSA's campaign is a high-cost one by American standards, the
agency's commitment is quite modest when compared on a per capita ba-
sis with a program like that of Great Britain. 2 Second, if the agency
expects to achieve long-term gains, it must adopt, or be allowed to adopt,
a truly long-term perspective. Changing the patterns of seatbelt use in the
absence of compulsory laws is, at best, likely to be a decade-long project,
not a three-year program. Yet, a comparison of the modest results to date
with the agency's initial projections suggests that NHTSA will find it dif-
ficult to muster the political support necessary to continue the program
long enough to achieve permanent gains in safety belt use. Finally, we
suspect that the cost of an adequately comprehensive seatbelt campaign
could prove to be so high that the program would be much less cost-effec-
tive than other regulatory options for reducing highway'fatalities. 3"
note 65, at 29-32. Britain spent $2.5 million per year for 10 years on a mass media campaign promot-
ing seatbelt use. During this time, usage rates increased from 12 to 33 percent. Sweden conducted a
series of combined mass media and education programs from 1971-1974, which increased usage rates
from 15 to 36 percent. Id.
119. Id. at 28-29. On a per capita basis, a campaign as extensive as the British effort could cost as
much as $10 million per year to reproduce in the United States-more than three times the $3.23
million per year that NHTSA claims to be spending on its current campaign.
120. Notwithstanding the alleged success of its mass media campaign, Great Britain enacted a
compulsory seatbelt law in August 1981. Sweden enacted its compulsory seatbelt law in 1975, only a
year after its seemingly successful seatbelt program was completed. See Hakkert, Zaidel & Sarelle,
Patterns of Safety Belt Usage Following Introduction of a Safety Belt Law, 13 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS &
PREVENTION 65 (1981), for a list of other countries that have passed compulsory seatbelt laws.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
122. See supra note 119.
123. See supra note 114.
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B. Reducing Burn Injuries
Project Burn Prevention, like the NHTSA safety belt campaign, pro-
vides several insights into the way government agencies employ education
campaigns. The program was more generously funded and more carefully
developed than most education campaigns. Its creators included in it a
detailed, comprehensive evaluation component and monitored the project
closely. At the same time, Project Burn Prevention, like many campaigns,
included only a brief implementation period. Despite its many positive
attributes, the program ultimately failed to generate measurable changes
in consumer behavior.
1. The Problem: Excessive Fire Deaths and Injuries
The United States shares with Canada the dubious distinction of having
the highest fire death rate in the world. 24 In the United States, fire is the
fourth leading cause of accidental death, and the second leading cause of
accidental death in the home.125 Fire causes almost 5,000 residential fa-
talities and over 21,000 injuries annually. 2 Most victims of fire in the
home are the very young and the elderly. 2 '
In response to national concern about fire safety, the newly-created
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) in 1974 commissioned a
consortium of Massachusetts institutions to develop a consumer education
program to promote burn injury prevention. 2 The one million dollar
project eventually stretched over four years. 12' The CPSC decided upon
an education program in this area, in part, because some expert opinion
held that education could address aspects of the burn problem not suscep-
124. GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, SELECTED INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF FIRE
LOSS: 1975-1978 (1980) (report prepared for U.S. Fire Administration).
125. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 80 (1983).
126. National Fire Protection Association, Fire Loss in the United States During 1982, FIRE
JOURNAL, September 1983.
127. ACCIDENT FACTS, supra note 125, at 80.
128. The Massachusetts General Hospital, one of the world's most respected teaching hospitals,
assumed financial and contractual responsibility for the project. The Shriners Burns Institute, a pedi-
atric intensive burn unit, provided project direction, technical assistance for implementation, and eval-
uation of the program's impact on burn injury rates. The Education Development Center, a nonprofit
educational research and development firm, produced the educational diagnosis, developed educational
materials, and evaluated changes in knowledge and attitudes among those participating in the pro-
gram. In addition, faculty at the Harvard School of Public Health and the Harvard Graduate School
of Education provided assistance in experimental design and data analysis. E. McLOUGHLIN, C.
VINCE, A. LEE, A. MACKAY, J. HALPERN & J. CRAWFORD, PROJECT BURN PREvENTION FINAL
REPORT: THE EFFECTS OF AN EXPERIMENTAL PUBLIC EDUCATION PROGRAM ON KNOWLEDGE, ATYI-
TUDES, AND BURN INJURY RATES 1975-1980 5 (1980) (report prepared for U.S. Consumer Product
Safety Commission) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
129. The actual implementation period, however, lasted only eight months. See infra text accom-
panying notes 142-43.
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tible to other means of remedy.'" Project Burn Prevention tested this
opinion, because it sought not only to measure changes in consumer atti-
tudes and knowledge, but also to measure changes in behavior-as re-
flected in reductions in the burn injury rate-resulting from the
program.131
2. The Campaign
Project Burn Prevention consisted of four phases: needs assessment,
program development and establishment of burn incidence baseline data,
program implementation, and evaluation and revision of program
materials.
1 82
In Phase I, the Project Burn Prevention researchers collected epidemio-
logical data 33 to determine the distribution, according to age and sex, of
burn injury victims,"3 relative frequency of different types of burn inju-
ries, '3 relative severity of different types of burn injuries, 3 6 and the dis-
tribution by age of victims of different types of burn injuries.' The re-
searchers used this data to relate burn injury patterns among different
population groups to their knowledge about burn injury and its preven-
tion. 3 ' Researchers concluded that the campaign should focus on scald
burns, because of their high frequency, and on flame burns, because of
their extreme severity." 9
130. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 128, at 4-5.
131. In this respect, Project Burn Prevention went beyond the other programs discussed in this
Article. In its seatbelt campaign, for example, NHTSA is studying use rates, not reductions in death
and injury. NHTSA claims an intention to measure reductions in death and injury at some future
point. See OFFICE OF OCCUPANT PROTECTION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRA-
TION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, EVALUATION PLAN 1 (1983).
132. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 128, at vii.
133. The burn injury data came from burn reports received under a mandatory reporting system
run by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. See C. HEALER, E. McLOUGHLIN & V.
GUILROY, BURN INJURIES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, KNOWLEDGE, BEHAVIORS, pt. 1, 3-4 (1976) (re-
port prepared for U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission) [hereinafter cited as BURN INJURY
REPORT].
134. Id. at pt. 1, 6 (finding that the very young have the greatest risk of burn injury).
135. See id. at pt. 1, 9. Scald burns represented the most common type of burn reported (44
percent). Next were flame burns (27 percent), contact burns (13 percent), radiation burns (sunburn,
sunlamps, etc.) (3 percent) and electrical burns (2 percent).
136. See id. at pt. 1, 10 (noting flame burns inflict the most severe harm).
137. Id. at pt. 1, 11.
138. The researchers administered questionnaires to obtain data concerning the participants'
levels of knowledge regarding burn hazards. To the researchers' distress, most people answered cor-
rectly only 35-50 percent of questions designed to elicit basic information. One item of special concern
arose from the study: while parents of young children seemed to know a great deal about scalds,
young children have the highest scald burn injury rate. This fact would seem to suggest that knowl-
edge per se is not a complete solution to the problem. Id. at pt. 1, 13-17.
139. Id. at pt. 1, 22. Some of the other more interesting conclusions: (i) while certain predominant
themes should be emphasized in burn prevention education, care must be taken to address specific
situations and age-related risks, rather than to broadcast vague generalizations and fear-provoking
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In Phase II, the Project Burn Prevention group developed informational
and educational materials designed to address five occasionally overlap-
ping audiences: (i) a general audience of all persons exposed to public
information through the mass media, (ii) children in grades K-i, (iii) chil-
dren in grades 2-3, (iv) high school students, and (v) members of certain
civic, fraternal and educational groups-generally young adults and the
parents and caretakers of young children-who could be reached through
community education channels.14
The researchers developed a wide variety of materials targeted to the
characteristics of different groups. The materials were designed to address
specific, age-related risks and to avoid vague generalizations and fear-pro-
voking messages. Materials ranged from thirty-second television public
service announcements and an information booklet to reach the general
public, to filmstrips and games for students, to lecture materials for civic
and fraternal groups."'
Phase III of the four-year project consisted of an eight-month message
implementation period, from October 1977 to May 1978.14s Implementa-
tion varied across geographic communities as well as across population
groups. For example, in the greater Boston standard metropolitan statisti-
cal area (SMSA) the group used only a mass media approach, which they
supplemented in one community with a school education program. In an-
other community, outside the Boston SMSA, the researchers used a com-
munity outreach program. These variations allowed the researchers to
compare the effectiveness of different approaches. In the evaluation phase,
Phase IV, the researchers performed three types of analysis. They ana-
lyzed comments by participants regarding the usefulness of the program;
compared levels of knowledge among program participants with their
baseline levels and with levels of knowledge among control population
messages; (ii) burn safety messages should be age-appropriate and action-oriented. Measurable behav-
ior change should be a primary goal; (iii) the educational campaign should aim to reach the broadest
possible range of socioeconomic groups; (iv) burn injury risk groups should not be approached in
isolation, but as interacting members of families. Messages addressed to each age group can be trans-
mitted among family members; and (v) consumers tend to respond to messages that address ways they
can protect other people, rather than themselves. People will often ignore precautions to keep them-
selves safe, yet will take great care to protect others. Id. at pt. 1, 24-27.
140. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 128, at 11-13.
141. For the public information campaign, the researchers developed four thirty-second television
public service announcements, three printed posters and an information booklet. For the school pro-
gram, the group developed cartoon books and films for grades K-1. The researchers used dramatic
presentations, a story card series and filmstrips with suggested follow-up activities for grades 2-3. To
reach high school students, the group developed films, audiocassettes, a student book, a simulation
game, small group exercises, and structured discussion groups to focus on specific hazards-high ten-
sion wires, flammable liquids and risks to children in their care-relevant to teenagers. Finally, to
promote fire safety through community outreach channels, the researchers developed lecture materials
for civic, fraternal and educational organizations. Id.
142. See id. at 7.
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groups; and compared burn injury rates before, during and after the im-
plementation period with burn injury rates in control communities.1" 8 The
evaluation did not include any quantitative analysis of attitude changes.
3. Results
The detailed evaluation scheme adopted by the research group was in-
tended to permit precise assessment of the effectiveness of the program
components. Different persuasion techniques did indeed produce dissimi-
lar effects. All participants, and especially those in the school programs,
praised Project Burn Prevention and expressed a desire to use its educa-
tional materials in the future. 144 Increases in knowledge about burn
hazards varied according to the setting and the materials used. The school
education program proved successful, albeit by varying degrees, in in-
creasing student knowledge about burn hazards. 4 O To a lesser extent, the
community outreach program also succeeded in increasing knowledge.
146
The public information campaign, however, with the possible exception of
an information booklet, had no measurable effect on adults' knowledge of
burn hazards. 4' Most significantly, statistical measurements of burn inju-
ries among the participants-the key variable measured-did not show
significant decreases in frequency or in severity.
14 8
143. The Project Burn Prevention group strongly criticized previous fire prevention campaigns
because they had "lacked a careful study design that would permit quantitative evaluation of the
effectiveness of the program, both to change knowledge and to have an impact on injury rates." Id. at
4. Accordingly, the group made evaluation a "major undertaking" of their campaign. Id. at 54.
144. Id.
145. The education program proved more successful with elementary school students than with
high school students, although the latter did achieve statistically significant increases in knowledge. At
the conclusion of the program, for grades K-I, 54 percent more classrooms in the experimental site
(Lynn) passed a written test on burn hazards than in the control site (Holyoke). Id. at 64. In grades
2-3, 68 percent more Lynn classrooms passed the test. Id. at 83. At the high school level (grades 10-
12), only about 10 percent more classrooms in Lynn passed the test than did those in the control site.
Id. The researchers attributed the superior performance among the lower grades to better cooperation
from elementary school teachers than from their high school counterparts. See id. at 100-101.
146. Although the community outreach program did not contain materials designed specifically for
use in the schools, this program component produced its most significant results in the schools. Appar-
ently, several teachers discovered the school materials in the public library in Quincy, the outreach
community, and subsequently used them in their classrooms. Several youth organizations used them as
well. Nineteen percent more grade K-1 classrooms in Quincy passed the written burn hazard test than
did their counterparts in Holyoke, the control site. Id. at 64. For grade 2-3 classrooms, the compara-
ble difference was 31 percent. Id. at 83. High school students in Quincy, however, demonstrated no
significantly greater burn injury knowledge than their control site counterparts. Id. at 111. Adults
questioned by telephone in the community outreach site, with the possible exception of those who had
received the informational booklet, demonstrated no significantly greater knowledge than those ques-
tioned in the control site. Id. at 186-87.
147. Id.
148. Id. at ix.
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4. Comments
Project Burn Prevention encountered problems that often plague educa-
tion campaigns: message attenuation and limited duration. The messages
conveyed by the project materials reached only a fraction of the total audi-
ence. Of that fraction, only a small portion were exposed to burn injury
situations; yet a smaller portion remembered the program messages; fewer
still-virtually none, according to the project results-were able to use
their increased knowledge to avoid a burn injury. 4 Evidently, the imple-
mentation period (eight months) was insufficiently long to overcome the
message attenuation. A longer implementation period would have in-
creased the cost of the project, but might have been more effective in in-
ducing behavioral change.
Two additional, methodological problems resulted from the relative in-
frequency of burn injuries. During its brief implementation period, Pro-
ject Burn Prevention in effect had to compete with random fluctuations in
the burn rate if it was to demonstrate significant results.1 50 The Project
Burn Prevention messages would have had to be extremely powerful and
persuasive to overcome the effect of random chance on the burn rate over
such a short period. It is hardly surprising that the program was unable
to generate statistically significant results under these conditions. More-
over, the project researchers, in a laudable attempt at precise measure-
ment, probably developed and separately analyzed too many program
components. The impact of each component was thereby diffused, and no
single component could be shown to have produced a measurable
impact."'
Notwithstanding the failure of Project Burn Prevention to generate
measurable reductions in burn injury rates, the researchers argued that
their results did not demonstrate the inadequacy of education programs.
They concluded "[tihe study shows that participants learned important
information about the prevention and emergency treatment of burn inju-
ries. Recognizing the problem is the first step in an often long and ardu-
ous process of raising public consciousness about a problem to the point
where public pressure builds to solve it.""' This analysis, of course, does
not speak to the effectiveness of education in reducing injuries. Rather, it
reveals that, over time, education can promote attitudes that allow for the
149. The significance of message attenuation can be illustrated by a concrete example. If, at each
of these four stages, theProject Burn Prevention program succeeded in reaching only one half of every
100 potential members of its audience, the number of people ultimately protected from injury because
of the program would be approximately six. (100 x x x x = 6.25) See id. at 40.
150. See id. at 41.
151. Id. at ix.
152. Id. at 56.
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creation of effective regulatory solutions which do not require individual
behavior modification.
The Project Burn Prevention researchers themselves eventually reached
this conclusion. In an article published two years after completion of the
campaign, members of the research group acknowledged the limited effec-
tiveness of education to promote safe behavior and thereby reduce the
burn rate.1" Education, in their view, could be used most effectively as
part of a set of strategies to reduce burn injuries. Future education pro-
grams, they argued, should focus on "[c]reating a public attitude of will-
ingness to accept those measures of passive protection that will reduce in-
juries and prolong life and good health.
'154
C. Attacking Heart Disease
The Stanford Three Community heart disease program described below
is unusual insofar as it produced persuasive evidence that an education
campaign using only mass media can modify consumer behavior. The sub-
stantial resources devoted to this small-scale study, however, suggest that
successful national education programs may be far more costly than most
policymakers believe.
1. The Problem: Heart Disease and Life Style
Heart disease is the leading cause of death in the United States. 55 Re-
search has shown that cigarette smoking, elevated plasma cholesterol and
hypertension increase the risk of heart disease.1"" Unfortunately, cigarette
smoking, diets high in saturated fat and cholesterol, sedentary living hab-
its and excess weight have proven severely resistant to change. Research-
ers have concluded that the habits influencing these cardiovascular risk
factors often are reinforced by culture and custom.157
153. McLoughlin, Vince, Lee & Crawford, Project Burn Prevention: Outcome and Implication,
72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 241, 246 (1982) (In general, passive measures that automatically protect the
community from injuries are more effective in the prevention of injuries than active measures that
depend on persistent behavior change.)
154. Id.
155. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
HEALTHY PEOPLE: THE SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON HEALTH PROMOTION AND DISEASE PRE-
VENTION 53-59 (1979) (in 1977, heart disease was responsible for over 700,000 deaths. Heart disease
is also the greatest cause of permanent disability claims among workers under 65.) See also Maccoby,
Farquhar, Wood & Alexander, Reducing the Risk of Cardiovascular Disease: Effects of a Commu-
nity-Based Campaign on Knowledge and Behavior, 3 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 100 (1977) (United
States morbidity and mortality due to cardiovascular disease rank second highest, after Finland,
among developed countries) [hereinafter cited as COMMUNITY HEALTH article].
156. See Farquhar, Wood, Breitrose, Haskell, Meyer, Maccoby, Alexander, Brown, McAllister,
Nash & Stren, Community Education for Cardiovascular Health, 1 LANCET 1192, 1192 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as LANCET article].
157. Id.
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2. The Campaign: The Stanford Three Community Study
In 1972, two Stanford professors-one in the medical school and one in
the school of communications-undertook to develop a heart disease edu-
cation campaign. Mindful of past failed attempts in this area, the profes-
sors sought to employ new and more sophistocated techniques. "8 Federal
grants of almost $4 million financed the five year project.' 59
The professors chose three California communities-Tracy, Gilroy and
Watsonville-for the program. They selected Tracy as the control city
because it is distant from and does not share broadcast channels with Gil-
roy and Watsonville. Gilroy and Watsonville share some television and
radio channels, but each town has its own newspaper.' 60
Notwithstanding their view that other education campaigns using mass
media had demonstrated little success,' 6' the researchers adopted this ap-
proach as one of the major components of the program. They used the
media to saturate residents of Gilroy and Watsonville with information
about how and why to adopt lifestyle changes to reduce the risk of heart
disease. The researchers acquired a substantial amount of free media
158. Id.
159. See Beyers, Can Health Habits Really Be Changed? PRISM, May 1974, at 13.
160. The three towns chosen were distinct communities, each with a population of about 15,000.
None was a bedroom community for any other major city, nor did any of the communities chosen
receive major television broadcasting from San Francisco, San Jose or any other major city. Beyers,
supra note 159, at 13.
After selecting the communities, the professors gathered a research team which selected from each
town a random sample of subjects between the ages of 35 and 59. The age distribution of the subjects
was chosen to allow the campaign to operate on those individuals whose lifestyles could be altered
before they reached the 60-70 year age bracket, where incidence of coronary disease is at its highest.
Id.
The team administered to each subject a 400-item behavioral questionnaire designed to determine
the level of knowledge of each subject and to identify the points at which each showed resistance to
persuasion. One item in the questionnaire asked the participants to respond to the statement "Break-
fast doesn't seem right without eggs." Thirty-five percent agreed. Thirty percent concurred with the
statement, "It's practically impossible to cut down on smoking." Another item, "I have a hard time
making myself get out and exercise," elicited agreement from 59 percent of those questioned. And 51
percent of the respondents believed that, "Sometimes, no matter what a person does, he gains weight."
Id. at 15-17.
The researchers found a certain amount of ignorance in addition to resistance. For example, most
respondents believed that pork contains more cholesterol than liver, when, in fact, pork is very low in
cholesterol. Id. at 17.
The researchers also performed physical examinations which included measurements of each sub-
ject's plasma cholesterol, triglyceride concentrations, blood pressure and weight. These data were then
used to develop a multiple logistic function of risk, based on the function developed in an earlier
study, see Truett, Cornfield & Kannel, A Multivariate Analysis of the Risk of Coronary Heart Dis-
ease in Framingham, 20 J. CHRONIC DISEASE 511 (1967) (noted in Beyers, supra note 159, at 103),
which yields a prediction of the probability that a subject will develop cardiovascular disease within a
period of roughly 12 years. Individuals in the top risk quartile were chosen for special study. In
Watsonville, a random subset of two-thirds of this high risk group (and their spouses) received face-
to-face intensive instruction. The other high risk individuals served as controls.
161. See LANCET article, supra note 156, at 1192.
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space, and spent an additional $500,000 for advertisements.' This com-
bination of free and paid media space permitted the researchers to pro-
duce substantial amounts of programming. 6 ' The researchers used a vari-
ety of printed matter, including posters placed in buses, stores and work-
sites, to supplement television advertising."' The program also incorpo-
rated a significant amount of material in Spanish to reach Spanish-speak-
ing participants.
Each participant received a basic booklet, The Heart Of The Matter,
filled with facts about atherosclerosis and ways to prevent it, along with a
78-page family guide, The Cook's Book, containing recipes designed to
reduce heart disease risk factors. Several researchers credited the pro-
gram's success to the printed materials because they provided participants
with specific guidance at critical points in their activities, such as meal
times. Other forms of communication might not have reached participants
when they were engaged in risk-enhancing activities.""3
A distinctive and successful-but obviously expensive-feature of the
Stanford program was its use of individualized behavior modification tech-
niques on certain participants, called "intensive-instructees," chosen from
among a high-risk group in Watsonville."' The techniques included an
analysis of the behavior patterns of the participants and specially tailored
programs to address the risk factors present in each participant's lifestyle.
For example, smokers who were lean and had normal plasma cholesterol
levels were given supplemental instruction about how to stop smoking, but
not about dietary changes. Similarly, those who had elevated blood pres-
sure levels were given special instruction in salt restriction and weight
loss, while individuals with elevated levels of plasma lipids were given
162. See Tudge, Preventive Medicine, California Style, WORLD MED., July 27, 1977, at 17, 19.
163. The researchers produced about three hours of television programming, 50 television spots,
100 radio spots, several hours of radio programming, weekly newspaper columns, and a number of
newspaper advertisements. Id. at 19.
A typical 60-second TV spot showed a man sitting down before a plate of eggs, bacon and toast. He
heavily salted the food. Then the plate suddenly disappeared. A narrator's voice intoned:
The great American breakfast really sets you up for heart disease. Egg yolks are high in
cholesterol. So are fatty meats, whole milk and butter. Too much sugar adds more risk of heart
trouble, so try a few replacements: substitute fresh fruits, low-fat milk and soft margarine.
You'll live longer - that's the heart of the matter.
Kiester, An Entire Town is Conquering America's No. I Killer, FAMILY HEALTH/TODAY'S HEALTH,
November 1976, at 34, 36-37.
164. See COMMUNITY HEALTH article, supra note 155, at 104.
165. See Beyers, supra note 159, at 53.
166. The behavior modification principles applied in the intensive-instruction program followed
five general steps: (i) analysis of the participants' behavior, (ii) modeling of the new behaviors, (iii)
guided practice in the new behaviors, (iv) artificial reinforcement from instructions in the new behav-
iors, and (v) maintenance of the new habits without artificial reinforcement. See COMMUNITY
HEALTH article, supra note 155, at 104.
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supplemental instruction in qualitative dietary changes.1' 7 Intensive-in-
structees and their spouses attended nine counseling sessions, each of
which varied in length from one and one-half to three and one-half
hours."'8
3. Results
According to the Stanford researchers, participants' knowledge about
dietary factors affecting heart disease improved as the level of the educa-
tion effort increased. In Tracy, the control town, increases in knowledge
were minimal; 9 in Gilroy and Watsonville, knowledge increases were
significant. 170 The greatest increases occurred among the Watsonville "in-
tensive-instructees," but groups in Watsonville and Gilroy that received
only mass media exposure also showed significant knowledge increases.,
Interestingly, and contrary to the results of most other studies on the same
point, 72 the Stanford researchers claimed "impressive" knowledge gains
among the less-advantaged Spanish-speaking groups. 
17
The researchers tested for behavioral changes in two ways: (i) by moni-
toring changes reported by the participants in their diets, exercise and
smoking habits, and (ii) by measuring physical changes such as weight
and plasma cholesterol levels.'
74
Reported changes in diet generally tracked participants' levels of in-
creased knowledge. For example, the intensive-instructees in Watsonville
reported the greatest change-a sixty percent drop in daily egg consump-
tion, whereas the Tracy control group showed only a nineteen percent
drop. 1 75 These results were consistent with the reported decreases in over-




168. One observer described the meetings, typically led by Stanford graduate psychology students,
as "part pep rally, part revival meeting, part church social and part health-and-hygiene class."
Kiester, supra note 163, at 37.
169. See COMMUNITY HEALTH article, supra note 155, at 108.
170. Id.
171. Scores in Tracy (control) at the end of the two year program rose 6.3 percent. In sharp
contrast, scores in Gilroy (mass-media only) rose 26.5 percent; in Watsonville (mass-media plus inten-
sive instruction) scores rose 40.8 percent. Researchers suspected the higher scores in Watsonville re-
sulted from diffusion of information from the intensive-instructees to other Watsonville participants.
Among participants identified as high-risk persons, scores rose 5.2 percent in Tracy (control); 27.7
percent in Gilroy (mass media only); and 54.2 percent in Watsonville (mass media plus intensive
instruction). Id. at 108.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
173. See COMMUNITY HEALTH article, supra note 155, at 108.
174. Id. at 109-113.
175. Id. at 111.
176. See Stern, Farquhar, Maccoby & Russell, Results of a Two- Year Health Education Cam-
paign on Dietary Behavior: The Stanford Three Community Study, 54 CIRCULATION 826, 828-30
(1976) [hereinafter cited as CIRCULATION article].
Yale Journal on Regulation
More significant were the physiological changes measured by the re-
searchers. Based on the lifestyle modifications reported by the partici-
pants, the researchers expected larger shifts in observed plasma cholesterol
levels than they actually found. To explain the discrepancy, the research-
ers suggested a propensity of participants to exaggerate the extent of
dietary and smoking changes they actually made.177 The Stanford group
also conceded that preferable measures of the program's success would
have been reductions in morbidity and mortality rates-data which could
not be generated because of the small scale and limited duration of the
program. 178 Nevertheless, according to the measurements actually taken,
plasma cholesterol levels shifted significantly during the course of the
campaign. 179 The researchers concluded that "the correlations between the
observed and predicted cholesterol changes imply that the reported dietary
changes are at least in part real, and ought not be dismissed as entirely
artifactual."' 80
Having succeeded where numerous others had failed-by demonstrat-
ing measurable changes in behavior through an educational program-the
Stanford researchers have begun a new project in a much wider geo-
graphic area to determine whether the results from the three communities
can be reproduced successfully. 8 They have not yet conducted any addi-
tional studies, however, to determine the staying power of the original
campaign. 82
4. Comments
The Stanford campaign avoided many of the pitfalls encountered by
other programs. The researchers were able to raise more money for the
campaign and to spend more time actually disseminating the message
than, for example, the Project Burn Prevention group was able to do.
Moreover, the Stanford team concentrated its efforts in small communi-
ties. The largest community in the Stanford program contained only about
15,000 people whereas Project Burn Prevention attempted, unsuccessfully,
177. Id. at 830-31.
178. See COMMUNITY HEALTH article, supra note 155, at 112.
179. See CIRCULATION article, supra note 176, at 831.
180. In addition to dietary changes, researchers also found significant improvements in the multi-
ple logistic function of risk (MLFR). See supra note 160. In Tracy, the control town, the MLFR rose
6.5 percent after two years; in Gilroy, where only mass media approaches were used, the MLFR
dropped 17.3 percent; and in Watsonville, where intensive instruction supplemented the mass media
approaches, the MLFR dropped 30.3 percent. See COMMUNITY HEALTH article, supra note 155, at
113.
181. Telephone interview with Dr. Nathan Maccoby, Professor of Communications, Stanford
University, (Aug. 25, 1983). In the larger study, the researchers plan to use community organizations
as a major information dissemination vehicle. Id.
182. Id.
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to spread its message throughout the Boston SMSA.
As one observer noted, the Stanford program was "perhaps the most
sophisticated preventive campaign yet seen in the western world."""3 The
very characteristics that contributed to the success of the program, how-
ever, illustrate the limitations of education campaigns generally. The
Stanford campaign demonstrates that education campaigns can be exceed-
ingly difficult to implement, and require large amounts of money, talent
and energy to produce meaningful results. 84 While the program's mass
media approach did produce measurable change, the greater success of the
intensive-instructee component demonstrates that health and safety per-
suasion programs may best succeed when undertaken by expensive, highly
labor-intensive methods. It remains to be seen whether campaigns can
succeed when they are supported with less money, staffed by modestly
trained employees rather than highly educated university professors and
graduate students, and directed at a wider geographic area.
III. Concluding Observations and Recommendations
Government spends millions of dollars on information and education
activities annually. Although the exact amount remains a matter of some
mystery, 8 5 it is indisputable that government involvement in these activi-
ties is considerable. Yet few campaigns undertaken in this country are as
carefully developed and implemented as the three analyzed in this article.
Few campaigns include any pre-testing to determine message appropriate-
ness or effectiveness. Few devote as many resources to implementing their
messages. Virtually none provides for evaluations of any behavioral
changes induced by the campaign. 86
183. See Tudge, supra note 162, at 17.
184. Id.
185. Determining exactly how much money the federal government spends on information and
education activities is difficult. See Yarwood & Enis, supra note 26, at 39 ("[tlhe various components
of such a figure are scattered throughout the budget, sometimes under ambiguous and/or unlikely
headings"). In 1982, the government spent $205.5 million for advertising, ranking 29th out of the 100
top national advertisers in total dollars spent. ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 8, 1983, at 1. Nearly all of this
advertising, however, was done by the armed forces, the U.S. Postal Service and Amtrak. See Squeeze
on Federal Ad Budgets, 17 MKTG. & MEDIA DECISIONS 62, 63 (1982). This figure does not include
donated advertising space, which makes up a substantial portion of government advertising. See
Clotfelter, The Scope of Public Advertising, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ADVERTISING 11-13 (D.
Tuerck ed. 1978) (paper presented at American Enterprise Institute Conference, July 9, 1976).
186. See Staelin, supra note 38. See also Bloom, Evaluating Social Marketing Programs:
Problems and Prospects, in MARKETING IN THE 1980S: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES 460, 460 (1980)
(suggesting that many social marketers tend to be reluctant to undertake evaluations because of their
feelings that evaluations "tend to be expensive, bothersome, risky (i.e., budgets can be cut if results are
poor), and capable of detecting only weak program effects."); Rossi & Wright, Evaluation Research:
An Assessment of Theory, Practice and Politics, 1 EVALUATION Q. 5-52 (1977).
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A. Reflections On Three Education Campaigns
Although the three campaigns reviewed in this Article are exceptional
in many ways, none stands as such an unqualified success that one can
conclude the key to public persuasion has been discovered. All provide
some insight into the process of persuasion but leave major questions
unanswered.
Project Burn Prevention 87 was the campaign least successful in pro-
ducing measured changes in behavior. With the aid of hindsight, some of
the reasons for its apparent lack of success seem clear. The program was
well conceived and well executed. As the project's developers discovered,
however, the program suffered in part because it relied too heavily on
mass media alone, attempted to impart too many messages through too
many approaches, devoted too little time to actual message implementa-
tion, and relied on an evaluation scheme that required very large shifts in
injury patterns to demonstrate significant campaign-related effects on
behavior.
In contrast, the Stanford Three Community heart disease campaign 88
avoided many of the shortcomings of Project Burn Prevention. The mass
media saturation approach used in the Stanford study did produce statisti-
cally significant changes in behavior, but the effects of the campaign were
greatest upon those individuals who also received intensive, face-to-face
counseling. It may be impractical to reproduce on a national level the
intensive media saturation and counseling techniques used in the heart
disease campaign.
The ongoing NHTSA campaign may answer some questions about
how expensive and intensive a nationwide campaign must be in order to
change the behavior of large numbers of citizens. A comparison of the
present NHTSA effort with previous safety belt campaigns suggests, how-
ever, that the agency is not devoting sufficient resources to produce mean-
ingful results. Unfortunately, in view of current congressional misgivings
about NHTSA's campaign,189 greater appropriations seem unlikely.
Although we have stressed that much remains to be learned about the
effectiveness of health and safety education campaigns, several points do
seem clear. One important lesson to be drawn from the case studies is that
health and safety hazards which apparently cannot be addressed by
agency standards or other types of regulation are not therefore necessarily
suitable candidates for information and education programs. These pro-
187. See supra Section ILB.
188. See supra Section II.C.
189. See Appropriations Hearings, supra note 73; Small Car Safety Hearings, supra note 5.
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grams may have limitations as great as, or greater than, regulation.19 °
Given human frailties, some accidents simply cannot be prevented.
Because human behavior patterns are often deeply ingrained, it also
seems clear that, where possible, policymakers seeking to address health
and safety concerns ought to favor campaigns that require only "one time"
actions by consumers. Campaigns to promote the purchase of smoke detec-
tors and the installation of safety latches on medicine cabinet drawers are
good examples. Education campaigns that attempt to alter patterns of be-
havior ought to be undertaken reluctantly-only after policymakers have
concluded there is no other feasible way to address a problem and that
education can solve the problem. 91
Health and safety education campaigns should be predicated on the as-
sumption that changes in behavior come slowly, modestly, and often ex-
pensively. Accordingly, government policymakers should shun "campaign
of the month" approaches. Once undertaken, campaigns that require long
implementation periods, as many do, should be supported for the time and
with the funding necessary to produce a successful result. Major cam-
paigns, like those discussed in this Article, should include detailed evalua-
tion components that will allow agencies to draw the appropriate lessons
from their own and other campaigns.
Finally, to avoid often wasteful expenditures, government policymakers
should insist that proposed education campaigns be subject to the same
rigorous, skeptical scrutiny that most proposed regulatory measures cur-
rently_ undergo. The failure to adopt such an approach will lead policy-
makers to opt unthinkingly for politically popular education campaigns
over more cost-effective alternatives such as regulations or, as may be ap-
propriate in many circumstances, no action.
B. A Proposal for Reform
Having analyzed the potential pitfalls of education campaigns, we
would like to suggest some possible reforms. We do not advocate an
abrupt halt to all ongoing information and education campaigns. Nor do
we recommend that agencies cease issuing press releases, fact sheets and
brochures. For present purposes, we suggest several specific changes in
campaigns we would classify as "major": that is, those campaigns which
either (i) require annual expenditures of more than $250,000, or (ii) ex-
190. See supra note 6.
191. By this, we mean that government should not attempt to do the impossible. Some groups,
such as hard-core drug addicts, simply may not be susceptible to persuasion by education campaigns.
Government should accept this limitation.
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tend beyond one year."' Campaigns of this magnitude should not be com-
menced without appropriate care to ensure efficacy and cost-effectiveness.
Accordingly, policymakers should consider undertaking major cam-
paigns only after making a number of findings and publishing them in the
Federal Register. Publication of the findings would permit input from a
variety of interested parties who might be in a position to contribute valu-
able suggestions. To preserve simplicity, we would not permit judicial re-
view of the findings."
The list of required findings might include the following:
1. The agency has identified the specific segments of the public
particularly at risk from the hazards to be addressed by the
campaign.
2. The segments of the public to be targeted are reasonably suscep-
tible to persuasion through an education campaign.19
3. For campaigns designed to alter a pattern of behavior, the
agency has concluded that no reasonable alternative campaign pro-
moting a "one time" preventive action by members of the target au-
dience could adequately reduce the hazards to be addressed by the
campaign.
4. For campaigns designed to alter a pattern of behavior, the
agency has estimated the time necessary for the campaign to elimi-
nate or adequately reduce the hazards to be addressed by the
campaign.
5. The educational materials and modes of distribution have been
sufficiently pre-tested on a small scale to permit the agency to draw a
reasonable inference that the materials will be successful on a wide
scale.
6. The agency has developed a reasonable evaluation plan designed
to measure behavioral changes induced by the education campaign.
Where appropriate and practicable, the plan should measure actual
reductions in the risks to be addressed by the campaign.' 95
192. These criteria represent our judgment regarding an appropriate threshold test against which
to examine education campaigns. Some agencies may routinely conduct campaigns that require
$250,000 annually, while the $250,000 would cover at most two or three CPSC campaigns in ten
years. The one-year criterion, however, would cover a number of campaigns at the CPSC and other
small health and safety agencies. These limits would not, we think, be over-inclusive.
193. Judicial review of.agency rulemaking, in contrast, is generally allowed. See, e.g., Administra-
tive Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1982); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1392(b) (1982); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2060 (1982).
194. See supra note 191.
195. Obviously, the best measure of success would be reductions in deaths and injuries. In many
campaigns, it will be too difficult to gather meaningful mortality and morbidity statistics. In most
cases, therefore, educators should measure changes in behavior, such as increased seatbelt use, that
seem likely to reduce injuries and deaths.
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7. The agency has compared the proposed education campaign to
alternative approaches, such as standards, to determine its relative
effectiveness in reducing the hazards to be addressed by the
campaign.
8. The costs of the campaign bear a reasonable relationship to the
benefits to be derived from the campaign. 96
Conclusion
Mark Twain once said, "Soap and education are not as sudden as a
massacre, but they are more deadly in the long run.""'  We agree with
Twain that education can be effective in many contexts."' We disagree,
however, that education does much good when it takes the form of a mul-
titude of short-term, poorly conceived campaigns. We believe millions of
taxpayer dollars are spent annually on education campaigns that produce
no tangible benefits. In many cases, these dollars could be spent reducing
deaths and injuries through more effective means. Until more careful
thought and planning are brought to bear to prevent this waste, we sus-
pect true regulatory reform will not have arrived.
196. This finding does not require a formal cost-benefit analysis. It seeks a comparison of the
known costs and benefits. We generally find the requirement for cost-benefit analysis to be over-
stressed in the case of regulations. To the extent that government engages in this type of analysis in
developing regulations, it should do so for education campaigns to avoid unfairly biasing officials in
favor of education campaigns.
197. M. Twain, The Facts Concerning the Recent Resignation, in MARK TWAIN'S SKETCHES,
NEW AND OLD 264, 265 (1875).
198. Education programs designed to change attitudes, for instance, may complement attempts to
control health and safety hazards by other means. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20 and 152-
54.

